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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon § 78-2-2(3) (j), 
and § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
by entering the Order and Judgment granting Plaintiffs' and Third 
Party Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment when disputed 
questions of material fact were clearly presented by affidavit 
and exhibit. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's 
decision on summary judgment as a question of law for 
correctness. Webb V. Ninow, 883 P.2d 1365 (Utah App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This action was brought by Appellees ("Oliversons") to quiet 
title to certain real property located in Utah County, Utah, (the 
"Property"). In response, Appellant ("Romero") counterclaimed to 
foreclose on the Property. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On or about December 9, 1994, the Oliversons filed a 
Complaint (the "Complaint)" against Romero seeking to quite title 
to the Property and recover damages for slander of title. On or 
about January 31, 1995, Romero Commenced a judicial foreclosure 
action on the Trust Deed by filing a Counterclaim, and Third 
Party Complaint. On or about August 15, 1996, Oliversons and 
1 
Third Party Defendant Bob Huish ("Huish") moved for Summary 
Judgment against Romero. On or about October 15, 1996, Romero 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
The matter came before the Trial Court for hearing on March 
18, 1997. The Trial Court granted Oliversons' and Huish's 
Motions for Summary Judgment on the grounds set forth in the 
Oliversons' Motion for Summary judgment dated August 15, 19 96, 
and Memorandum filed in support thereof, also dated August 15, 
1996.x Huish filed a separate Motion and Supporting Memorandum 
for Summary Judgment which adopted and relied upon the grounds 
set forth in the Oliversons' Motion and Supporting Memorandum for 
Summary Judgment.2 
D. Statement of Facts 
The following undisputed and disputed facts are material to 
the consideration of questions presented in this appeal: 
Undisputed Facts: 
1. The real property (the "Property") which is the subject 
of this action is located in Utah County, Utah. The Property is 
more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING 4.90 ^ chains South of the Northwest corner 
of the Southwest ]4 of Section 19, Township 4 South, 
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running 
thence 3 9 min. West 187.5 feet; thence South 5 deg. 21 
1
 Record, page 3 79, % 1-2 (Order and Judgment). 
2
 Record, page 323-327 (Third Party Defendant Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment). 
2 
min. West 95.4 feet; thence North 86.5 deg. East 3 0 
feet to the Point of Beginning.3 
2. In 1986, Romero and Huish entered a transaction, 
whereby Romero loaned Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) to Huish. 
(the "Obligation").4 
3. The Obligation was secured by a Trust Deed dated July 
2, 1986.5 
4. On or about July 3, 1986, the Trust Deed was recorded 
against the Property in the office of the Utah County Recorder, 
in which Huish, who then owned the Property, was the named 
Trustor and Romero the named Beneficiary.6 
5. On or about October 29, 1986, Stephen and Ruth 
Oliverson (the "Oliversons") acquired the Property from Huish.7 
6. The Trust Deed has not been reconveyed and remains as a 
lien on the Property.8 
3
 Record, page 378, % 5 (Order and Judgment). 
4
 Record, page 364-362 (Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
5
 .Id; see also Record, page 194, % 2 (Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
6
 Record, page 194, U 2 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
7
 Record, page 193 K 7 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
8
 Record, page 193, % 9 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
3 
7. On or about December 9, 1994, the Oliversons filed a 
Complaint (the "Complaint)" against Romero seeking to quite title 
to the Property and recover damages for slander of title.9 
8. On or about January 31, 1995, Romero Commenced a 
judicial foreclosure action on the Trust Deed by filing a 
Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint.10 
Disputed Facts: 
9. On or about April 23, 1986, Huish executed and 
delivered to Romero a Promissory Note (the "April 23rd Note") in 
the sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00), together with 
interest to which was secured by the Trust Deed.11 
10. On or about July 2, 1986, and to secure payment of the 
April 23rd Note, Huish executed and delivered to Stewart Title of 
Utah, as trustee, for the benefit of Romero, the Trust Deed.12 
11. Romero received the following payments from Huish as 
partial satisfaction of the amount owing under the Obligation and 
9
 Record, pages 18-01 (Plaintiff's Complaint). 
10
 Record, page 48-34 (Defendant's Answer, Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint) . 
11
 Record, pages 364-63 (Defendant's Affidavit in Support of 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment); Record, page 48-34 (Defendant's Answer, Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint). 
12
 Xd. Record page 194, paragraph 2 (Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement). 
4 
Trust Deed: $100.00, August 7, 1986; $100.00, November 15, 1987; 
$50.00, May 27, 1989; and $100.00, December 7, 1992.13 
12. Despite diligent efforts, Romero was unable to locate 
Huish in order to arrange further payment and satisfaction of the 
Obligation.14 
13. Huish failed, neglected and refused, despite repeated 
demands by and on behalf of Romero, to pay the Obligation 
evidenced and secured by the April 23rd Note and Trust Deed.15 
14. Huish's failure to pay the amount due under the April 
23rd Note and Trust Deed constituted an event of default.16 
15. Because of Huish's default, Romero elected to declare 
the entire remaining unpaid balance owing under the April 23rd 
Note secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable.17 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
§ 78-12-1 Utah Code Ann. Time for commencement of actions 
generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
13
 Record, page 366, % 5 (Defendant's Affidavit in Support of 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgement). 
14
 Id, at 111 6-7. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id; Record pages 48-34 (Defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim). 
17
 Record pages 48-34 (Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim). 
5 
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute. 
§ 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. Within six years - Mesne profits 
of real property - Instrument in writing - Distributing of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) For the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) Upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded 
upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 
78-12-22. 
§ 78-12-35 Utah Code Ann. Effect of absence from state. 
Were a cause of action accrues against a person when he is 
out of the state, the Action may be commenced within the term as 
limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after 
a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of 
his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
§ 78-12-44 Utah Code Ann. Effect of payment, 
acknowledgment, or promise to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment 
of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay 
the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within 
the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise 
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
6 
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any 
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Romero appeals the decision of the trial court on the 
basis that the there were genuine issues of material fact raised 
by Romero and presented to the trial court which precluded the 
entry of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. In the 
present case, it is undisputed that a legitimate obligation was 
created in favor of Romero and secured by the Trust Deed which 
currently encumbers the Property owned by the Oliversons. 
However, the Parties are in serious disagreement as to whether 
the Trust Deed remains valid and enforceable. 
To resolve such disputes, the Oliversons and Huish moved for 
summary judgment. By way of affidavit and exhibits, the Parties 
presented competent and conflicting evidence to the trial court. 
The issues raised and facts presented by the Parties focused on 
disputes as to the actual obligation secured by the Trust Deed as 
well whether such obligation was in fact satisfied prior to the 
running of the applicable statute of limitations. Such 
conflicting evidence and factual disputes are central to 
resolution of this matter, and at a minimum, should have been 
presented to the trier of fact, rather than resolved as a matter 
of law. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEN THERE EXISTED QUESTIONS OF MATERIAL FACT 
This Court has consistently held that on appeal from summary 
judgment, the reviewing Court will "review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, while giving no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions". ProMark Group, Inc. v. 
Harris Corp., 860 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah App. 1993); accord Projects 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 
738,743 (Utah 1990). Furthermore, "any doubts concerning 
questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence should be resolved in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment." Beehive Brick Co. v. 
Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In 
addition, because of the drastic and harsh nature of summary 
judgment, "the court should be reluctant to deprive the parties 
of the opportunity to fully present their contentions at trial." 
Welchman v. Wood, 337 P.2d 410, 411 (1959). Therefore, if the 
reviewing court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the trial court's determination must be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. Beehive Brick, 780 P.2d at 831. 
The determination of whether to award summary judgment is 
governed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
rationale of the Rule is revealed by its language: 
... judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
8 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any-
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
UTAH R.CIV.P. 56 ( C ) . (emphasis added). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further 
provides that the affidavits filed in connection with a summary 
judgment motion, "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matter stated therein." UTAH R.CIV.P. 56(e). 
It should be stressed that "it only takes one sworn 
statement to dispute averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create issues of material fact, thereby 
precluding summary judgment." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). The sworn affidavit of Romero filed in opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth several admissible 
facts which conclusively demonstrate the presence of material and 
disputed issues of fact.18 As a result, summary judgment was 
clearly improper, where, as in this case, critical and material 
issues of disputed facts are present. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. 
Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
A. THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE MATERIAL 
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHICH PROMISSORY NOTE WAS 
SECURED BY THE TRUST DEED PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In the present case, the Oliverson's arguments for summary 
judgment are riddled with disputed issues of material fact and 
18
 Record, pages 371-359 (Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
9 
statements. In fact, the very nature of the Parties' competing 
claims, i.e., whether the obligation was satisfied, raise several 
issues of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment. 
First of all, there is a material dispute as to which 
promissory note is actually secured by the Trust Deed. The 
Oliverson's position is that the Trust Deed is "security for a 
July 2, 1986 promissory note".19 On the other hand, Romero 
claims that the Trust Deed actually "secures a promissory note 
dated April 23, 1986." 20 The determination of which promissory 
note is actually secured by Trust Deed is critical to 
establishing the Parties' respective rights and obligations under 
the Trust Deed. Therefore, "the presence of such a disputed 
material fact precludes summary judgment". Brown Realty, 562 
P.2d at 238-39. 
B. THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE 
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER 
THE OBLIGATION SECURED BY THE TRUST DEED 
WAS IN FACT SATISFIED PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In addition to the material factual dispute as to which 
promissory note is actually secured by the Trust Deed, the 
Parties are also in disagreement as to whether the underlying 
obligation, ("Obligation") which is evidenced by either the April 
23, 1986 note or the July 2, 1986 note and secured by the Trust 
Deed has been fully satisfied. In their Motion for Summary 
19
 Record, pages 197-171 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
20
 Record, pages 371-359 (Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
10 
Judgment, the Oliversons assert that because the July 2, 1986 
note "states that it is payable in full 'upon closing of the sale 
o f the Property",21 and because the "closing of the sale" 
occurred on or before October 29, 1986, as evidenced by the 
recording of the Warranty Deed conveying title from Huish to 
them,22 that by implication the Obligation was in fact 
satisfied. On the other hand, Romero alleges that not only is 
the Trust Deed secured by the April 23, 1986 note, rather than 
the July 2, 1986 note, but, as set forth below, he has not 
received full payment or satisfaction of the Obligation.23 Such 
a dispute is not only critical to resolution of the case, it is 
also a question of fact and as a result, should be resolved by 
the trier of fact. 
C. THE EXISTENCE OF A 
GENUINE MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT 
AS TO WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WAS TOLLED PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Oliversons take 
the position that Romero is barred by the statute of limitations 
from enforcement of, or collection on the obligation secured by 
the Trust Deed.24 In support of that position, the Oliversons 
21
 Record, page 193, % 6 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement). 
22
 Record, page 193, % 7 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement). 
23
 Record, pages 364-362 (Defendant's Affidavit in Support of 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgement). 
24
 Record, pages 191-189 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement). 
11 
assert that Romero's right to foreclose or otherwise enforce the 
Obligation, is time barred by §78-12-23(2) Utah Code Anno., which 
provides for a six (6) year statute of limitations for any 
actions "upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing". JEd. Specifically, the Oliversons 
allege that the "closing" of the sale on or about October 29, 
1986 triggered the running of the six year statute of limitations 
under §78-12-23(2) upon which to foreclose the Property.25 As a 
result, because Romero did not bring the foreclosure action until 
on or after January 31, 1995, over eight (8) after the "closing", 
he was time-barred from foreclosing on or enforcing the Trust 
Deed and underlying obligation".26 
However, under § 78-12-44, Utah Code Ann., if Romero 
received payments of any part of the principle or interest due 
under the obligation, then the statute of limitations runs anew 
from the date of receipt of the latest payment. Section 78-12-
44, reads as follows: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid,or an 
acknowledgement of an existing liability, debt or 
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the period 
prescribed for the same after such payment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. (emphasis added). Such tolling has 
long been recognized by the Utah Courts. Holloway v. Wetzel, 45 
P.2d 565 (Utah 1935). 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
12 
In the present case, there is a sworn affidavit by Romero 
that he did in fact, receive a series of payments up until 
December 7, 1992 as partial satisfaction of the Obligation 
secured by the Trust Deed.27 Specifically, Romero states in his 
sworn affidavit, that he received the following payments on the 
underlying Obligation: $100.00, August 7, 1986; $100.00, November 
15, 1987; $50.00, May 27, 1989; and $100.00, December 7, 1992. 
Romero, therefore, argued to the trial Court that as a result of 
the subsequent payments and acknowledgments of the underlying 
obligation, the six-year statute of limitations contained in § 
78-12-23(2) Utah Code Ann., was actually tolled by § 78-12-44, 
Utah Code Ann. 
Therefore, under the facts presented by Romero to the trial 
Court, at the earliest, the cause of action to foreclose on or 
otherwise enforce the Trust Deed accrued at the time of the last 
evidence of payment, or on approximately December 7, 1992.28 
Consequently, and pursuant to §78-12-23 and §78-12-44, Utah Code 
Ann., as well as established Utah case law, Romero had six (6) 
years, or until December 7, 1998, within which to commence the 
action to foreclose on or otherwise enforce the Trust Deed. At 
the latest, Romero commenced this action at the time of the 
filing of the answer and counterclaim, or January 31, 1995, 
27
 Record, page 363-359, HI 5-6 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgement). 
28
 Id. 
13 
almost three years prior to the running of the applicable statute 
of limitations.29 
In addition to the disputed facts concerning subsequent 
payment and acknowledgement of the debt, the six-year statute of 
limitation was also tolled by Huish's absence from the State of 
Utah pursuant to § 78-12-35 Utah Code Ann., which provides in 
relevant part that: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when 
he is out of the state, the action may be commenced 
within the term as limited by this chapter after his 
return to the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1991). Therefore, because there are 
disputed facts concerning Huish's absence from the State of Utah, 
which if ultimately proven, would also toll the six-year statute 
of limitations contained in §78-12-23(2) Utah Code Ann., and 
allow Romero to properly foreclose or otherwise enforce the Trust 
Deed. In addition, in certain circumstances where the statute of 
limitations would bar a parties' claim, proof of concealment or 
misleading by the other party may preclude the other party from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. See e.g., 
Myers v. Mcdonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); Vincent v. Salt 
Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978); Rice v. Granite School 
District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
In this case, Romero, by and through sworn affidavit, 
presented admissible facts, which if found to be true would toll 
the applicable statute of limitations upon which to bring an 
Record, pages 48-34 (Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim). 
14 
action on the Trust Deed and underlying Obligation. 
Specifically, Romero stated in his affidavit, that he had "spent 
considerable time and effort in attempting to locate Huish to 
arrange further payments", and that he "was informed by Huish's 
landlords, as well as by the Oliversons, that Huish had left the 
State of Utah.30 Such facts as well as the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them, i.e., that Huish was concealing 
his whereabouts to avoid dealing with the obligation to Romero, 
thereby tolling the statute of limitations. 
Because Romero presented admissible facts in a sworn 
affidavit, which, if proven, would toll the six-year statue of 
limitations contained in §78-12-23(2) Utah Code Ann., and allow 
him to properly foreclose on or otherwise enforce the enforce the 
Trust Deed and underlying Obligation pursuant to § 78-12-44, Utah 
Code Ann., such facts should be presented to the trier of fact, 
rather than resolved as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled to 
Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
Assuming arguendo, the non-existence of any material issue 
of fact, summary judgment is nevertheless proper only where the 
moving party has made a "showing which precludes, as a matter of 
law, the awarding of any other relief to the losing party.11 
Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative, 359 P.2d 18, 19 
30
 Record, page 3 63, H 7 (Defendant's Affidavit in Support of 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgement). 
15 
(Utah 1961). The Oliversons must "clearly" show that "there is 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
prevail." Frisbee v. K & K construction Company, 676 P.2d 387, 
389 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the above standard. The 
existence in this case of an agreement between Romero and Huish 
and an obligation arising thereunder as evidenced by the Trust 
Deed is undisputed.31 These facts, along with Romero's sworn 
affidavit that such Obligation remains unsatisfied, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to Romero, creates a reasonable 
probability that Romero may prevail on his claim to enforce the 
Obligation secured by the Trust Deed. At a minimum, such facts 
establish a question for the trier of fact. Summary judgement, 
therefore, was improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing substantial and persuasive reasons, 
Appellant Romero respectfully submits this Brief for the Court's 
consideration and determination, and requests that the judgment 
of the lower court be reversed and the matter remanded for trial, 
DATED this ' ' day of December, 1997. 
APPEL & WARLAUMONT, L.C. 
By ._ . 
J^m^s RXWilson 
•^^topney for Appellant 
31
 Record, page 194, \ 2 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / ' day of December, 1997, I 
caused a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT to be 
hand-delivered to: 
Robert Dale 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE& PARKINSON 
455 East 500 South #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and mailed to: 
Gordon Duval 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
J. Scott Lundberg 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
ames Rr'. Wilson 
Attp^fney for Appellant 
S 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Robert J, Dale, #0808 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN D. OLIVERSON and RUTH 
H. OLIVERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO and J. SCOTT 
LUNDBERG, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 940400709 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 
18, 1997, at 1:15 p.m., pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, on Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated August 15, 1996, and on Third Party Defendant Bob 
K. Huish's ("Huish") Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 2, 
1996. Robert J. Dale appeared for Plaintiffs. James R. Wilson 
appeared for Defendant Lester Romero ("Romero"). Kirk G. Gibbs 
appeared for Third-Party Defendant Bob Huish. The Court having 
reviewed the motions, all applicable memoranda and other pleadings 
03? 
on file herein, having heard oral argument, and having ruled from 
the bench, for good cause shown, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
The grounds for the Court granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment are the grounds set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated August 15, 1996, and Plaintiffs' 
"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,,f 
dated August 15, 1996. 
2. Third Party Defendant Huish's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. The grounds for the Court granting Huish's 
Motion for Summary Judgment are the grounds set forth in "Third-
Party Defendant Huish's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment," dated October 2, 1996, in Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated August 15, 1996, and in Plaintiffs' 
"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment," 
dated May 2, 1996. 
3. There is no just reason for delay and the Court 
directs that a summary judgment as hereinafter set forth be entered 
in favor of Plaintiffs and Huish, as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to Plaintiffs' and Huish's 
respective Motions for Summary Judgment. 
- 2 -
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4. Defendant Romero's Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint on file herein, and any and all other claims in this 
action of Romero against Plaintiffs and/or Huish, are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as against Plaintiffs 
and Huish. 
5. All of Plaintiffs' rights, titles, and interests in 
and to the following described real property located in Utah 
County, Utah (the "Property"), are quieted as against Defendants 
and as against any and all persons and entities claiming by, 
through, and/or under Defendants or either of them (hereafter, 
collectively, "Defendants"), and as against all claims of 
Defendants to any right, title, trust deed, lien, encumbrance, 
and/or other interest of any kind claimed by Defendants or any of 
them in, to, or on the following described property (the 
"Property"): 
COMMENCING 4.90 1/2 chains South of the Northwest 
corner of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 19, Township 
4 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
and running thence East 165 feet; thence North 69 
feet; thence North 82D 39f West 187,5 feet; thence 
South 5D 21 • West 95.4 feet; thence North 86.5 East 
3 0 feet to the Point of Beginning. 
6. Specifically, and without limitation of any kind 
upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs' rights, titles, and interests in 
and to the Property are hereby quieted as against that certain 
Trust Deed recorded on and against the Property wherein Defendant 
- 3 -
Romero was and is named as the beneficiary, which Trust Deed was 
dated July 2, 1986, and was recorded on July 3, 1986, in the office 
of the Utah County Recorder, as Entry No, 21182, in Book 2318, at 
Page 683 (the "Romero Trust Deed"). 
7. The Romero Trust deed is hereby declared to be null 
and void and of no force or effect whatsoever, including without 
limitation as a trust deed, lien, or encumbrance of any kind on or 
covering the Property. 
8. The following document recorded in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder, pertaining to the Romero Trust Deed, is also 
hereby declared to be null and void and of no force or effect 
whatsoever: Notice of Default and Election to Sell, dated May 12, 
1994, executed by J, Scott Lundberg, and recorded May 19, 1994, as 
Entry No. 41890, in Book 3447, at Page 290. 
9. Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined and 
restrained from continuing or commencing any foreclosure of the 
Romero Trust Deed and from any other efforts to enforce the Romero 
Trust Deed against the Property. 
DATED this 2H day of If n 1997 . 
- 4 -
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This Order and Judgment 
are Approved as to form 
(including without 
limitation the inclusion of 
the Rule 54(b) certification) 
James R. Wilson 
y^^ 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first class mail, postage 
prepaid, this / ^ ^ day of */mif 1997, to: 
James R. Wilson f 
9 Exchange Place 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
10 Exchange Place 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gordon Duval 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
J. Scott Lundberg 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
